This is a philosophical question. You might as well ask if a person could learn to play chess solely by observing people while they play chess. In fact it is basically the same kind of question Nelson Goodman asks in his great book Fact, Fiction, and Forecast: how can we move from a finite set of observations already made to a prediction of future observations. The observations already made would be the observed chess moves so far and the future observations would be all chess moves that haven't happend yet. The questions is, is there a nomological relation between past observations and future observations (as opposed to the purely causal relation between past events and future events)?
If we interpret the word nomological as by a law of nature or logic and nothing can ever happen in disaccord to this law then, there is certainly no such relation, since the first person who moves a castle diagonally, would break the law of nature and the universe as we know it would collapse.
But even if, in fact, by some freak accident of nature, every move any chess player in the world would make from now on, was valid (nobody would ever make any mistakes or try to cheat and even people clueless about the rules of chess would start pushing chess pieces around randomly across the board, but accidently always according to the rules), that would not convince us that there is a law of nature (or a law of logic) that forced all of this. We'd consider it purely accidental.
Ludwig Wittgenstein covered similar ground in his Philosophical Investigations. He insists that any set of observations is in accordance to arbitrarily many, and even conflicting, rules. For example, if all chess games observed by me would have happend in the afternoon, then my rule could be in the afternoon the bishop can only be moved diagonally. That the time of day is unimportant to the game is something that couldn't have been observed by me since I haven't observed chess games during different times of the day. Or, incidentally, if I have never observed a woman playing chess, then the rule could be the bishop can only be moved by men at all. What is relevant to an observation and what is not is determined as a prerequisite to the observation and cannot be part of the observation itself.
BTW: Wittgenstein's solution to the problem is quite similar to that of Goodman. I won't spoil the surprise, though ;-)
Addendum:
In the days when Sussman was a novice, Minsky once came to him as he sat hacking at the PDP-6.
"What are you doing?", asked Minsky.
"I am training a randomly wired neural net to play Tic-tac-toe", Sussman replied.
"Why is the net wired randomly?", asked Minsky.
"I do not want it to have any preconceptions of how to play", Sussman said.
Minsky then shut his eyes.
"Why do you close your eyes?" Sussman asked his teacher.
"So that the room will be empty."
At that moment, Sussman was enlightened.
On the 8th turn the knight may not turn right.On a sunny day the pawns may jump over bishops.The computer can't say why that pawn didn't move on a particular turn. Maybe there was a rule against it moving in that particular circumstance. Hence, the computer should only be able to reproduce similar (actually, exact) patterns, but never be able to deduce the rules with 100% confidence. – deceze Jul 12 '11 at 11:38On a sunny day the pawns may jump over bishops.if you never shown that to him. – Max Jul 12 '11 at 11:43